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ABSTRACT
The doctrines of contributory copyright liability and contributory trademark
liability are both based on the confluence of basic tort liability and the policy goal
of encouraging innovation and commerce. Because the two concepts sometimes
conflict, courts have struggled to create a comprehensive body of law to reach a
reconciliation. The doctrine of contributory copyright liability evolved through a
rich body of case law that was subsequently supplemented by the legislatively
enacted Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In contrast, the doctrine of
contributory trademark liability is a purely common law doctrine and has not
witnessed legislative intervention. This article posits that the contributory
trademark doctrine has evolved in a parallel manner to the contributory copyright
doctrine through judicial common law, with courts imposing liability based on the
same principles and factors as those underlying findings of liability in copyright
cases. Thus, the same three factors can be identified that consistently distinguish
cases of liability from those cases where the courts have not held service providers
and distributors liable in both copyright and trademark cases. Namely, courts
reach findings of “liability” in cases where: (1) the users known to be attracted to
the product/service are dubious; (2) an overriding percentage of uses are
infringing; and (3) there is overt bad faith on the part of the service provider.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article proposes that the doctrines of contributory copyright and
contributory trademark liability are based on the confluence of the doctrine of
basic tort liability and the policy goal of encouraging innovation and vigorous
commerce as new products and services are developed. 1 Because basic tort
liability relies on the concept of imputed intent, and this concept sometimes
conflicts with the policy goal of encouraging innovation, courts have struggled to
create a comprehensive body of law to reconcile the two. Generally, and in the
online context specifically, courts have come to similar outcomes in the arenas of
contributory copyright and trademark liability, albeit through different paths of
legal evolution. Underlying these results, three factors can be identified that
consistently distinguish cases of liability from those cases where the courts have

* J.D., UCLA School of Law, Class of 2011. B.A. Communications, University of California, Los
Angeles, Class of 2007. B.A. Psychology, Touro College Los Angeles, Class of 2007. My thanks to
Professor Mark F. Grady at the UCLA School of Law for his guidance and insights during the writing
of this article. I would also like to thank the editorial staff at the Pepperdine Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship & the Law for helping me prepare this article for publication
1
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (citing
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
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not held service providers and distributors liable.
The doctrine of contributory copyright liability evolved through a rich body
of case law that was subsequently supplemented by the legislatively enacted
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 2 The DMCA strove to keep
copyright law intact while providing online service providers with certain “safe
harbors” from liability. 3 Though the legislatively imposed DMCA is said to have
“shifted the burden” in the copyright context, 4 the DMCA has been implemented
by the same courts that developed the initial common law doctrine, applying the
same policy goals as those underlying the initial common law. These courts have
interpreted and applied the DMCA so as to form a body of case law that is
consistent with the initial body of contributory infringement case law.
In contrast, the doctrine of contributory trademark liability is a purely
common law doctrine and has not witnessed legislative intervention. This article
posits, however, that the contributory trademark doctrine has evolved in a parallel
manner to the contributory copyright doctrine through judicial common law, with
courts imposing liability based on the same principles and factors as those
underlying findings of liability in copyright cases. Hence, both trademark and
copyright contributory liability have evolved similar doctrines, reaching congruent
results when applied to recent cases in the online context.
II. THE ORIGINS OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
A. The Lanham Act—Trademark Infringement
Section 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from using another’s
mark without permission “in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .” 5 To
be liable under section 32, a person must use the mark on competing or related
goods in a way that creates a likelihood of confusion. 6
B. The Copyright Act—Copyright Infringement
The Copyright Act states, in pertinent part:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of [a] copyright . . . has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords . . . (3) to distribute copies or

2
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2010); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, PUB. L. NO. 105–304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998).
3
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
4
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA
notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially
infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the
copyright.”).
5
15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a) (West 2005).
6
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(citations omitted), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999).
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phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly . . . . 7

C. Basic Tort Law and Contributory Infringement: Imputed Intent
In both copyright and trademark law, even if an individual has not directly
infringed upon a copyright or trademark, he may nevertheless be liable under the
doctrine of contributory infringement, “a judicially created doctrine that derives
from the common law of torts.” 8 Contributory infringement stems from the notion
that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should be held
accountable. 9 An argument for imposing indirect liability is that, in certain
circumstances, “it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work
effectively against all direct infringers, [and] the only practical alternative [is] to
go against the [indirect infringer] for secondary liability on a theory of contributory
or vicarious infringement.” 10
The Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., notes that even
though the Supreme Court in the seminal case of MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., initially “tells us that contribution to infringement must be intentional for
liability to arise,” 11 Grokster later directs courts to analyze contributory liability in

7

17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2002).
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). See MetroGoldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“Although ‘[t]he
copyright act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,’ these
doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the
law.”) (citations omitted).
9
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 1 NIEL BOORSTYN,
BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.06[2], at 10–21 (1994) (“In other words, the common law doctrine that
one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortuous act is jointly and severally liable with the
prime tortfeasor, is applicable under copyright law.”)); Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Although there is no statutory rule of liability for infringement committed by
others, “the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious
liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.”
RTC, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
435 (1984)).
10
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–39 (holding that there was a strong argument for imposing indirect
liability in the context of software service that allowed for the downloading of infringing content)
(citing In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[r]ecognizing the
impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of individual infringers”; also
explaining that if a breach of contract can be prevented most effectively by actions taken by a third
party, it makes sense to have a legal mechanism for placing liability for the consequences of the breach
on the third party, as well as the party that broke the contract; and noting that a copyright license is just
a type of contract)).
11
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grokster,
545 U.S. at 930).
8
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light of “rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.” 12 Common
law principles establish when intent may be imputed; namely, “[t]ort law ordinarily
imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable consequences of
his conduct,” or “consequences . . . certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his act.” 13 Thus, the underlying requisite for contributory liability under principles
of tort law is “intent,” but this requisite may be satisfied by proof of actual intent
or “imputed intent,” comprised of elements that amount to a proxy for intent. 14
The “rule” adopted by courts for purposes of contributory liability in
copyright law, in line with the principles of “imputed intent,” is that “one who,
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
‘contributory’ infringer.” 15 The “knowledge” requirement for contributory
copyright infringement was further elaborated upon by courts over time to be an
objective one: “it is sufficient that the defendant [know or] have reason to know
that infringement is taking place.” 16
Courts have adopted a similar rule in the context of contributory trademark
infringement; namely, that:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit. 17

Thus, consistent with basic tort law, contributory copyright and trademark
infringers are both liable for their actions under similar standards, with language

12

Id. at 1170 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934–35).
Id. at 1171 (quoting DeVoto v. Pac. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1908);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965) (“If the actor knows that the consequences are
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if
he had in fact desired to produce the result.”) (emphasis added)).
14
Id.; Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary liability with roots in the tort-law
concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent.”) (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264); Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007)).
15
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citation omitted); see also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
16
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 487 (1984) (discussing Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(holding individuals would be liable if “it could be demonstrated that they knew or should have known
that they were dealing in illegal goods”)); see also Cable/Home Commc’ns Corp. v. Network Prods.,
Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845, 846 n.29 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v.
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding knowledge
is whether the secondary infringer “knew or should have known” of the infringing activity); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (using term “constructive knowledge” to
describe viable alternative to actual knowledge); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.
2004).
17
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Contributory infringement occurs when
the defendant either intentionally induces a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplies a
product to a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe
the service mark.”).
13
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requiring “knowledge” or “inducement” as a proxies for intent.
D. Application of Liability to Service Providers as well as Product
Providers
It should be noted that under the common law, service providers, including
internet service providers, are subject to the same liability as product providers, for
both contributory copyright and trademark infringement purposes, according to the
principles of tort liability. 18
E. Is Contributory Trademark Infringement Different from Contributory
Copyright Infringement?
In dicta, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Inwood test to require that the
contributory infringer have (1) knowledge of the direct infringer’s identity, as
opposed to mere identification of the infringing goods required by copyright law, 19
and (2) knowledge that the goods are indeed “infringing” as opposed to using the
trademark in a permitted way. 20 As a result, courts have espoused the view that
the knowledge standard is harder to satisfy in trademark cases than in copyright
cases. 21

18
See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) & cmt. d (1979); other citation omitted).
[T]reat[ing] trademark infringement as a species of tort and have turned to the
common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability. . . .
[T]he Restatement of Torts tells us that [an individual] is responsible for the torts
of those it permits on its premises ‘knowing or having reason to know that the
other is acting or will act tortiously. . . .’ The common law, then, imposes the
same duty on landlords and licensors that the Supreme Court has imposed on
manufacturers and distributors.
Id.; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004 (upholding that district court’s ruling that without support services
defendant provides, users could not download infringing content, and hence, that Napster as a service
provider is akin to a landlord providing “the site and facilities” for direct infringement”); Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Inwood’s test for contributory trademark
infringement applies on its face to manufacturers and distributors of goods. Courts have, however,
extended the test to providers of services.”).
19
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 855; emphases added) (“Sony certainly
does not ‘intentionally induce[]’ its customers to make infringing uses of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights,
nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing
infringement of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights. . . .’”).
20
Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 964 (“Contributory infringement doctrine has always treated
uncertainty of infringement as relevant to the question of an alleged contributory infringer’s knowledge.
. . . The existence of numerous legitimate, non-infringing uses of the term . . . further illustrates the
uncertainty inherent in the question of whether [defendant] knew or had reason to know of infringing
uses of domain name registrations.”).
21
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (“If Inwood’s narrow standard for contributory trademark
infringement governed here, [the plaintiffs’] claim of contributory infringement would merit little
discussion.”); Lockheed, 985 F. Supp at 951, 966 (finding no knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of potential infringing uses by domain name registrants, because of “the inherent uncertainty in defining
the scope of intellectual property rights in a trademark,” and the subsequent “uncertainty inherent in any
determination that use of a domain name is infringing”); id. at 965 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439, n.19)
(“Because the property right protected by trademark law is narrower than that protected by copyright
law, liability for contributory infringement of a trademark is narrower than liability for contributory
infringement of a copyright.”).
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These two distinguishing issues are often moot, especially in the online
context. With regard to the “additional” requirement in trademark law that the
contributory infringer have knowledge of the direct infringer’s identity, as opposed
to mere identification of the infringing goods, 22 in the online context identification
of the infringing goods and identification of the direct infringer’s identity are
frequently compounded—occurring concurrently. For example, once a posting of
an infringing good or use of an infringing domain name is identified by a service
provider, the online identity of the user is also identifiable (unless, of course, the
service provider has explicitly created a service that encrypts users’ identities). 23
With regard to the requirement that the contributory infringer know that goods are
indeed infringing, as opposed to employing a trademark for a permitted use, 24 in
the copyright context, a comparable type of knowledge is required. A contributory
infringer is similarly required to know that a work has indeed been infringed, as
opposed to being copied legally, such as under the fair use doctrine. 25 Thus, in a
practical sense, in the online context the basic knowledge standard for contributory
copyright and trademark infringement do not differ significantly.
III. WHEN CAN INTENT BE IMPUTED?
A. Chasing Imputed Intent: A Case-By-Case Approach
In copyright and trademark law, the courts have developed complex dicta, in
an attempt to accommodate a second policy goal that, in some instances, competes
with the reasoning behind the doctrine of “imputed intent” in tort law. This second
policy goal is “the value of innovative technology,” or “leav[ing] breathing room
for innovation and a vigorous commerce.” 26 When a new service with new
capabilities emerges, courts are concerned with preserving potential commercial
growth from that service’s non-infringing capabilities, even if these same
capabilities can be put to infringing uses. 27 This policy goal weighs especially
heavily in the online context, where new services have expansive potential uses—

22

Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19.
See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted) (holding that defendant can not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself
from learning that (maybe all) the users of his service are copyright infringers).
24
Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 964.
25
See Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1373–74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction due to a material question of fact as to
whether internet service provider “knew or should have known” of infringement following receipt of a
notice letter stating that copyrighted work had been posted on its system, when there was a colorable
question of fair use; “[w]here a[n online service] operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copyright notices on the copies,
or the copyright holder’s failure to provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a likely
infringement, the operator’s lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability
for contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its system.”).
26
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005)
(citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
27
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Sony Court
declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made and sold equipment
capable of both infringing and ‘substantial noninfringing uses.’”) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
23

186

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:I

both infringing and non-infringing—that can spur prospective commercial growth.
However, the opposing policy of protecting copyrights is just as strong in the
online context, where “digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens
copyright holders as never before[:] because every copy is identical to the original,
copying is easy.” 28 The Supreme Court has recognized the gravity of the dilemma
in balancing:
[T]he respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection
and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the
incidence of liability for copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is
favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration
of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff. 29

In balancing the doctrine of imputed intent with the goal of commercial
growth, courts have slowly defined the contributory liability doctrine on a case-bycase basis by identifying instances where liability should be imposed. In
contributory copyright and trademark law, generally, and in cases regarding online
service providers, specifically, courts have constructed dicta that seem to
significantly increase the awareness necessary to meet the “knowledge” standard in
an effort to further the goal of commercial growth. From dicta, it may seem that
through this process, the courts have weakened the “imputed intent doctrine” to
reach findings of “no liability.”
However, a closer look at the case law reveals that the individual case
outcomes are consistent with the doctrine of imputed intent, and that despite broad
dicta, courts still reach findings of “liability” in cases where certain factors appear:
(1) the users known to be attracted to the product or service are dubious; (2) an
overriding percentage of uses is infringing; and (3) there is overt bad faith on the
part of the service provider. The same courts espousing limiting dicta simply
employ alternative reasoning and doctrines to reach results of “liability” in cases
where the policy goal of “commercial growth” is inexorably overridden by a strong
proof of “imputed intent” due to provision of a product or service to a dubious set
of users, an overwhelming percentage of infringing uses, and proof of overt bad
faith on the part of the service provider.
1. The Design of a Product
Regarding whether intent may be imputed purely from the design of a
product, courts have made two key holdings: first, intent may be imputed, and
liability may be predicated upon “distributing a product distributees use to infringe
copyrights, if the product is not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially
significant’ non-infringing uses.” 30 This rule is completely consistent with the

28

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928–29.
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“The [Supreme] Court was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by
means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the
technology.”).
30
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grokster,
545 U.S. at 942).
29
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doctrine of imputed intent in tort law: even if the distributor did not specifically
intend that his product be used for infringement, if the product or service is not
capable of any substantial legal use, tort law would dictate imputing to the
distributor the intention to cause infringement as the “natural and probable” 31
consequences of his conduct. 32 This rule is also completely consistent with the
policy goal of furthering commercial growth: because the product (or service) has
no commercially significant non-infringing uses, no legitimate commercial growth
is being stymied by holding the contributory infringer liable and limiting the
product’s or service’s availability. 33
Conversely, the Supreme Court held that intent may not be imputed, and
liability may not arise, merely because a product capable of infringing use has been
sold, so long as the product is also “capable of substantial non-infringing uses.” 34
This rule, likewise, is consistent with the doctrine of imputed intent in tort law
because, so far as the service provider is concerned, infringement is not the only
“natural and probable” consequence 35 of selling that product; non-infringing
conduct is just as “natural and probable” since the product has equal capabilities
for facilitating infringing and non-infringing conduct. 36 Consequently, in the
online context, courts have held that “a computer system operator cannot be [held]
liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.” 37
This rule is also completely consistent with the policy goal of furthering
commercial growth: because the product has commercially significant noninfringing uses, legitimate commercial growth would be obstructed by holding the
contributory infringer liable and limiting the availability of the product or
service. 38

31

See id. at 1171 (internal quotation omitted).
See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932 (“In sum, where an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but
infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”) (citations omitted).
33
Id.
34
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (rejecting
imposition of liability based on “the fact that [Sony] sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the
fact that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material”).
35
See Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932–33 (“Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of
selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.”); see A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
37
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (“[We] will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.”)
(citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
38
See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The [Supreme] Court
was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new
technology at the price of possibly denying non-infringing consumers the benefit of the technology.”).
32
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2. When the Actual and Prospective Use of a Product or Service and
Online Services is Known: The Implicit and Explicit Actual
Knowledge Requirement
The true quandary arises, however, when the distributor of a product or
service has knowledge that his product or service will be used, or is already being
used, for substantial infringing activity. As soon as the distributor knows that the
vast majority of uses of the product are infringing or will be infringing, it becomes
“certain, or substantially certain” that the product or service will be used for
infringing conduct. 39 Under the common law doctrine of torts, it would seem that
liability should be imposed and intent should be imputed, because in this case,
infringement is the “natural and probable consequence[s] of [the distributor’s]
conduct.” 40 However, to hold an individual liable under the imputed intent
doctrine if the product is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, even if the
product is being used or will be used almost singularly for non-infringing uses,
could be perceived to quash room for innovation and vigorous commerce by
creating liability for a product or service that has substantial potential for noninfringing uses. 41 Additionally, there is a concern that an innocent “defendant
[who] merely [intended to] sell[ ] a commercial product suitable for some lawful
use,” will be ambushed by liability when the product is overridingly used by
infringers. 42 Thus, in this situation, the desire to protect innovation and commerce
appears to conflict with the imputed intent doctrine.
Prior to Grokster, some lower courts touted these principles of tort law,
stating that liability should be imposed on a distributor who has knowledge that
most current or prospective uses of his product or service are infringing, despite
the capability for substantial non-infringing uses, unless the distributor can
demonstrate substantial actual non-infringing uses. 43 The subsequent Supreme
Court language in Grokster read Sony to remove the ability to impute intent, and
therefore knowledge, based on the characteristics or uses of a product (even if it
the product is used primarily or solely for infringing purposes), so long as the
product or service is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 44 However, it
39
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.
(1965) (“If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”)).
40
Id.; see Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 982, 987 (Coco-Cola
claimed a rival soft drink maker had infringed Coca-Cola’s mark because bars purchasing the rival soft
drink had substituted it for Coca-Cola; holding “[b]efore he can himself be held as a wrongdoer o[r]
contributory infringer one who supplies another with the instruments by which that other commits a
tort, must be shown to have knowledge that the other will or can reasonably be expected to commit a
tort with the supplied instrument.”) (emphasis added).
41
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933.
42
Id. at 936.
43
See In re Aimster Copryight Litig., 334 F.3d at 649–50, 652 (stating that “some estimate of the
respective magnitudes of [] uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement” and holding
that even though the evidence did not exclude the possibility of substantial non-infringing uses, the
burden of production was on Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial non-infringing uses,
not is merely capable of them) (emphasis added).
44
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933–34.
Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause
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should be noted that despite this dicta, the court officially reserved the issue “of the
point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on
distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.” 45
As a result of the ambiguity surrounding this issue, courts have struggled
with exactly how much “knowledge” is required to impute intent. Implicit in
Grokster’s reading of Sony, 46 is a limitation on the facts that can be considered in
determining whether a distributor has constructive knowledge of infringement;
namely, the known actual uses of a product cannot be considered in determining
whether constructive knowledge (or imputed intent) exists. 47 In past cases, actual
use of a product was the primary basis for inferring constructive knowledge (e.g.
massive proportion of use was infringing), 48 and therefore Grokskter’s
interpretation of Sony effectively imposes a requirement of actual knowledge.
In light of Grokster, it is not surprising that in the online context, specifically
in cases where the overriding majority of uses are infringing, courts have explicitly
required actual knowledge, thereby deeming the constructive knowledge doctrine
entirely ineffective:
For providers of Internet services, . . . a more refined test applies . . . a computer
system operator can be held contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that
specific infringing material is available using its system[] . . . and can take simple
measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works, . . . yet continues to
provide access to infringing works. 49

These holdings seem to further whittle away the stronghold of imputed intent
and extend the Sony ruling; whereas, at most, Sony eliminated only one type of

infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of
substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for
infringement. . . . Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law
from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product.
Id. at 941. “[Sony] struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that
the products capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and
consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others.” Id.
45
Id. at 934 (“[W]here evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it
may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement,
Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”; stressing that evidence that product may be put to
infringing use is insufficient, in contrast to inducement, but not discussing when there is evidence that
the product has been put to infringing use); see id. at 935.
46
The relevant quote in Sony, that is the cause of so much deliberation, follows:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case it must rest on the
fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that
their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the
imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
47
See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Sony case was “one about liability resting on
imputed intent,” not one about “liability on any theory”). “Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent
as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product.” Id.
48
See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that constructive
knowledge existed when infringement took place in “massive quantities” and “routinely” at operators’
swap meet).
49
Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10–00264 WHA, 2010 WL 2198204, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May
28, 2010) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007))) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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constructive knowledge, holding that mere design or structure of a service
(capability of being used for infringing conduct) is insufficient to impute
“knowledge.” 50 Napster extended Sony, requiring actual, specific knowledge and
holding that constructive knowledge is never sufficient, even where it stems from
facts other than product design or use. 51 Actual knowledge has also been
explicitly required by courts in the trademark context. 52
3. The Problems with Eroding “Constructive Knowledge” and the
“Actual Knowledge” Requirement
Several problems exist with eroding the “constructive knowledge” doctrine
generally, and specifically, in requiring actual knowledge in the online context.
First, barring courts from considering constructive knowledge (either explicitly or
effectively) in their liability calculus directly eats away at an established principle
of tort law—namely that if an individual has “reason to know” that he is aiding and
abetting an illegal act, he should be held liable. 53 Furthermore, though the stated
reason behind the “actual knowledge” requirement in the online context is the
inability of an online service provider to examine every hyperlink for potentially
defamatory material, 54 this reasoning still does not explain why a provider of an
online service used overwhelmingly (or entirely) for infringing uses (with no
actual substantial non-infringing uses), should not be held liable for continuing to
offer the service, regardless of whether specific instances of infringement can be
identified easily. Finally, such an approach cuts against an accumulated
established body of case law holding that constructive knowledge generally, and
actual and prospective use of a product or service in particular, are important

50
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436) (“[A] computer system operator cannot
be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the
exchange of copyrighted material.”).
51
Id. at 1021 (“[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer
system operator cannot be held liable for contributory infringement . . . . We agree that if a computer
system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such
material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”) (citing
Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (holding that for online bulletin board operator to have
sufficient knowledge, the copyright holder must “provide the necessary documentation to show that
there is a likely infringement”); Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d at 726–27 (after stating that sale of a
product with a particular design is an improper basis for imputing intent if the product is capable of
substantial non-infringing use, the court did not consider if constructive knowledge could be proven in
another way, and moved on to analysis of whether Google “knowingly t[ook] steps . . . substantially
certain to result in such direct infringement”).
52
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] service provider must have
more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods
. . . [s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the
future is necessary.”).
53
See Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (“Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention
to cause the natural and probable consequences of his conduct,” or “consequences [] certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his act.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.
(1965))).
54
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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considerations in determining liability. 55
This article proposes that though some courts have verbally stripped the
constructive knowledge doctrine, and claim to disregard certain factors such as the
percentage of use that is infringing and the type of users attracted to a product or
service, 56 in reality (1) courts have employed other doctrines to hold individuals
liable where fact patterns dictate that liability be found due to the existence of
constructive knowledge; (2) recent results are consistent with prior case law,
because despite dicta stating that the holdings are based on different legal
doctrines, several underlying factors can be identified that consistently distinguish
cases of liability from those cases where the courts have not held distributors
liable; 57 and (3) the policy goals behind dicta limiting constructive knowledge
have been maintained through the DMCA’s safe harbors and the common law.
4. Does It Even Matter or Is It All Just Dicta? The Shift to Alternative
Doctrines
This article proposes that despite the erosion of the constructive knowledge
doctrine, courts have employed alternate doctrines to hold individuals liable where
key factors dictate that liability be found, all the while building and maintaining a
body of case law with consistent results and comporting with the original common
law doctrine of imputed intent. 58 Three such doctrines that have been used to hold
individuals liable for contributory infringement are: (1) actual knowledge; (2)
inducement; and (3) willful blindness.
a. Actual Knowledge
The simplest doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when
key factors dictate that liability should be found is the doctrine of actual
knowledge. 59 To meet this doctrine in the online context, a service provider must

55
See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
plaintiff adequately alleged the element of knowledge when swap-meet operators were aware of “ongoing sales of infringing material” due to a letter and raids seizing 38,000 counterfeit recordings; even
though operators lacked actual knowledge of specific infringing conduct or specific infringing vendors,
liability was found due to fact that operators knew that premise was used substantially for sale of
infringing goods, serving as proof of imputed intent); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (reasoning that from
the record, Napster had “knowledge, both actual and constructive,” of direct infringement, supporting a
finding of liability); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding liability
based on the failure of Aimster “to produce any evidence that its service has ever been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the frequency of such uses”); Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (found “reason to know” to be basis for holding online service provider
liable).
56
See, e.g,. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (criticizing the district court for “plac[ing] undue weight on
the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future non-infringing use”).
57
See Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (proposing that
holdings in different cases are factually consistent).
58
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–35 (2005)
(“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case
was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”).
59
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (citations omitted) (relying, in its reasoning, on existence of
actual knowledge for its finding of liability even though “it [wa]s apparent from the record that Napster
has knowledge, both actual and constructive of direct infringement. . . .”); but see Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at
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have actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its
system and be able to take simple measures to prevent further damage to
copyrighted works. 60 Courts have held that intent to assist infringement can be
imputed to a service provider with such knowledge. 61
b. Inducement
The second doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when key
factors dictate that liability should be found is the inducement doctrine. The
Supreme Court adopted the concept of “inducement” from patent law, finding that
“[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement” in the copyright context. 62 In Grokster, the Supreme Court held that
distribution with “direct evidence of unlawful purpose,” such as “statements or
actions directed to promoting infringement,” may be enough to prompt liability;
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” 63
The classic case of inducement is by enticing or persuading another to infringe,
such as by advertising an infringing use or instructing a user how to engage in
infringing use. 64
Some courts have stated that the knowledge standard must be proven
independently from the inducement standard in the copyright context, based on the
standard test language from Gershwin, that a defendant is a contributory infringer
if he has “[(1)] knowledge of the infringing activity, [and (2)] induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . .” 65 However, in
Grokster, no mention was made of a separate knowledge requirement; merely
demonstrating inducement was sufficient. Thus, separate allegation and proof of
the element of “knowledge” is not required in the copyright inducement context. 66
In the trademark context, inducement has long been established as a way to
establish liability. 67 Furthermore, in trademark law, the knowledge requirement
264 (where court just stated “that plaintiff adequately alleged the element of knowledge,” but didn’t
explain whether knowledge was actual or constructive, and seemingly, from the facts and reasoning
based its holding on constructive knowledge since operators lacked actual knowledge of specific
infringing conduct or specific infringing vendors).
60
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
61
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although neither
Napster nor Netcom expressly required a finding of intent . . . both decisions ruled that a service
provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis for imposing contributory
liability. Under such circumstances, intent may be imputed.”).
62
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Visa, 494 F.3d at 795 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930).
63
Grokster,545 U.S. at 935–37 (emphasis added).
64
Id. at 935–36.
65
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citations omitted); see Visa, 494 F.3d 788 (stating that the knowledge element is separate from the
material contribution or inducement element).
66
See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935 (court performed no separate assessment of whether “knowledge”
existed; inducement standard was met without proving knowledge; “where evidence goes beyond a
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or
actions direct to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”).
67
See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 529–31 (1924) (drug
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for imputing intent when a distributor continues to supply a product or service to
someone whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, is clearly severed from the requirements of inducement. 68 Thus,
separate allegation and proof of the element of “knowledge” is not required in the
trademark inducement context.
Courts have stated that inducement is the doctrine employed when actual
evidence of intent exists, and as such, intent does not have to be imputed. 69
However, because the line between proven intent and imputed intent is a fine one,
several cases that fall under the category of imputed intent arguably could also be
construed to meet the “proven intent” standard. 70
c. Willful Blindness
The third doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when key
factors dictate that liability should be found is the willful blindness doctrine.
Willful blindness has been used in both the trademark and copyright context. 71
Courts have held “that willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for
purposes of the Lanham Act.” 72 In the trademark context, courts have explained
that “[t]o be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately

manufacturer, whose salesmen suggested to distributors that prescriptions for plaintiff’s drug could be
filled by substituting defendant’s drug, held liable for intentionally inducing distributors to pass off the
defendant’s drug to purchasers as the plaintiff’s, either in direct terms or by suggestion or insinuation;
“[o]ne who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is equally
guilty and liable for the injury”).
68
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (the rule in the context of
contributory trademark infringement is that “if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”) (emphases added); Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Contributory infringement occurs when
the defendant either intentionally induces a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplies a
product to a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe
the service mark.”).
69
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if
there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived
from the common law.”).
70
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) (court
held that Napster was liable under the doctrine of “knowledge” plus “material contribution,” but noting
that Napster executives “promoted the site with screen shots listing infringing files”) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added); Visa, 494 F.3d at 795 (“In an Internet context, we have found
contributory liability when the defendant ‘engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the
infringement.’”) (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that knowledge was adequately alleged, and finding sufficient evidence to
show material contribution but also finding that “Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the
environment and market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive. Its participation in the sales cannot be
termed ‘passive,’ as Cherry Auction would prefer”).
71
See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.
1992) (defining willful blindness and remanding to determine whether the evidence supports a
conclusion of willful blindness); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law [] where indeed it maybe enough that the defendant
should have known of the direct infringement.”) (citations omitted).
72
Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149 (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir.
1989)).
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fail to investigate.” 73 However, an individual does not have an affirmative duty to
take reasonable precautions against the sale of counterfeits or to seek out and
prevent violations—the “reason to know” standard for contributory liability only
requires an individual to understand what a reasonably prudent person would
understand without further investigation. 74
Willful blindness has been given a parallel definition in the copyright
context; it is also considered equivalent to knowledge in the copyright law context:
[W]here indeed it may be enough that the defendant should have known of the
direct infringement, as it is in the law generally. . . . One who, knowing or strongly
suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he
does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings
is held to have a criminal intent, because a deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of mind. 75

Willful blindness is a doctrine where intent is imputed because a provider
takes steps to make sure not to acquire information that would have led him to
knowledge of direct infringement sufficient to impute intent. 76 Because the line
between these two methods of imputing intent is a fine one, several cases where
courts employ the doctrine of “knowledge” to hold a provider liable arguably could
also be construed to meet the “willful blindness” standard. 77
d. Conclusion
The three doctrines under which courts impose contributory liability—
inducement, willful blindness, and “knowledge” plus “material contribution”—are
not entirely independent. These doctrines pose varying manifestations of the same
concepts of intent and imputed intent derived from common tort law. Courts claim
to employ the inducement standard when evidence of intent is most clear; because
actual evidence of intent exists, intent does not have to be imputed. 78 In situations

73

Id.
Id.
75
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted) (holding that defendant can
not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and maybe
all) the users of his service are copyright infringers).
76
Id.
77
See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding liability and
imputing intent under constructive knowledge doctrine; holding that AOL had reason to know of
copyrighted works posted on its service because it prevented itself from acquiring actual knowledge of
infringement by changing its contact e-mail address in unreasonable manner: it (1) failed to registering
the change with the Copyright Office in a timely manner, and (2) failed “to configure the old e-mail
address [for complaints] so that it would [] forward messages” to the new address or return new
messages to their senders, so complaints went unheeded without notice to complainants that their
messages had not been delivered); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding liability for contributory copyright infringement based on actual and constructive
knowledge, but noting that “a document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker mentioned ‘the
need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated
music.’”); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Hard Rock
Café, 955 F.2d at 1149) (finding contributory trademark infringement without elaborating how
knowledge standard was met, and stating that “a swap meet cannot disregard its vendors’ blatant
trademark infringements with impunity”).
78
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005)
74
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where evidence of intent is less prominent, courts have held that intent to assist
infringement can be imputed to a service provider with actual knowledge who
continues to provide access to infringing works (or, as articulated in the online
context, “actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its
system,” when simple measures can be taken to prevent further damage). 79 The
reasoning behind imputing intent is that a passive omission (“knowing failure to
prevent infringing actions”) is comparable to an act intending the infringing
actions to occur. 80 Finally, under the willful blindness doctrine, intent is imputed
because a provider takes steps to make sure not to acquire information that would
have led him to knowledge of direct infringement sufficient to impute intent. 81
Many courts attempt to delineate three distinct situations where intent or
imputed intent may exist, analyzing whether liability should be imposed under any
of the three separate doctrines. 82 However, in reality all three doctrines are located
along a continuous spectrum measuring the existence of “intent”; as a result, cases
that are analyzed by courts under one doctrine could often be analyzed under
another as well, leading some courts to blend the analysis for the different
doctrines. 83
5. Does it Even Matter or Is it All Just Dicta? The Three Underlying
Factors
Courts have held online service providers liable for contributory
infringement under a variety of different doctrines in internet cases, making it
seemingly difficult for online service providers to predict the outcome in a given
lawsuit. This article considers the consolidated body of case-law concerning
online contributory copyright and trademark infringement, and attempts to identify
several factors that consistently distinguish cases of liability from those cases
where the courts have not held internet service providers liable, even though
according to case dicta, liability may have been analyzed under different legal
doctrines. 84 As described below, the three factors may manifest differently in each

(“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case
was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”).
79
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Napster, 239
F.3d at 1022; Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); see id. at 727 (held that “an actor may be contributorily liable [under Grokster]
for intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are
substantially certain to result in such direct infringement”) (emphasis added).
80
Id. (“Although neither Napster nor Netcom expressly required a finding of intent . . . both
decisions ruled that a service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis
for imposing contributory liability. Under such circumstances, intent may be imputed.”).
81
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted) (holding that defendant can
not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and maybe
all) the users of his service are copyright infringers).
82
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795–802 (9th Cir. 2007)
(performing separate analysis as to whether “knowledge,” “material contribution,” or “inducement”
existed).
83
Id. at 801 (noting that “the Amazon.com court did not bifurcate its analysis of contributory
liability into ‘material contribution’ liability and ‘inducement’ liability”).
84
See id. at 795 (proposing that holdings in different cases are factually consistent and
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of the different doctrines of inducement, knowledge, and willful blindness.
The three factors identified by this article which consistently distinguish
“liability” cases from “no liability” cases in the contributory trademark and
copyright infringement contexts generally, and in the online context specifically,
are: (1) whether the “users” known to be attracted to the product or service are
“dubious” or not; (2) whether an overriding percentage of uses is infringing; and
(3) whether there is overt bad faith on the part of the service provider. Every case
does not necessarily implicate all three factors; however, in a case where, for
example, only two of the factors are implicated, this article proposes that they are
still predictive of the outcome.
These three factors are predictive of whether liability will be found in a
given case, because the factors relate to the intersection of two competing goals
underlying contributory infringement: (1) reaching results consistent with the
underlying concept of “intent” or “imputed intent” based on common law tort
doctrine, and (2) reaching results that further the policy goal of encouraging
innovation and a vigorous commerce, as new products and services are
developed. 85
a. Dubious Users
The first factor is when a distributor knows that the types of users attracted to
its product or service are “dubious” or untrustworthy, and seeking to infringe; if
present in a given case, this factor is predictive of a finding of liability. 86 Once a
service provider knows that the types of users attracted to its product or service are
dubious it is not automatically liable; rather, its level of responsibility is
heightened—especially this factor conflates with either of the others. Policy-wise,
this factor comports with both (1) the imputed intent doctrine (when the types of
users attracted to a service/product are dubious, the “natural and probable
consequence[]” of continuing to supply the service/product is infringement, and
thus intent may be imputed), 87 and (2) the policy goal of encouraging innovation
when new products and services are developed, and the desire to encourage
vigorous commerce does not extend to services or products that attract illegal
conduct. 88
distinguishing present case factually from precedent to explain the contrary holding; “viewed in
isolation, the language of the tests described is quite broad, but when one reviews the details of the
actual ‘cases and controversies’ before the relevant court in each of the test-defining cases and the
actual holdings in those cases, it is clear that the factual circumstances in this case are not analogous”).
85
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933–34 (2005)
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)) (“[Sony] struck a
balance between the interests of protection and innovation . . . .”).
86
See generally Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Aris Getty, Inc., 55 F.3d 718, 719 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding the defendant common carrier contributorily liable because it delivered unbranded gasoline to
“dubious” gas stations it knew would resell the gasoline under the Getty brand name).
87
“Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable
consequences of his conduct,” or “consequences [] certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
act.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If the actor knows
that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he
is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. (1965) (emphasis added))).
88
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933, 941 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442) (“[Sony] struck a balance between
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This factor features strongly under the inducement doctrine, where a
provider actively solicits users that are dubious, as opposed to merely continuing to
provide a service or product that is known to attract such users. 89 The knowledge
doctrine presents a more subtle manifestation of this factor: when a distributor
knows generally that the types of users attracted to his product or service are
dubious (constructive knowledge) or that particular dubious users are actually
infringing (actual knowledge), and nevertheless continues to supply them with his
unaltered product or service. 90 Conversely, for a distributor who supplies a service
or product to trustworthy users, without actual knowledge of the identity of
specific infringers or specific instances of infringing conduct, courts are much less
likely to find liability—the more trustworthy the general user body, the more
knowledge of specific instances of infringement is required to lead to a finding of
liability. 91 Finally, under the willful blindness doctrine, a service provider
suspects that the types of users attracted to his product or service are dubious, but
blocks exposure to further information that would give him knowledge of
particular instances of infringement or the ability to identify and terminate
infringers. 92 Thus, liability under all three legal doctrines is predicated on the
contributory infringer’s knowledge that his product or service attracts dubious
users.
This factor is similarly predictive of liability when a particular subgroup of
users is identified as dubious (as opposed to the general user base of a service). 93
This factor is also implicated in a court’s determination of whether a report of a
specific instance of infringement or an infringing user, provides a distributor with
the interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial lawful
employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts
of others.”).
89
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 860–61 (1982) (White, J., concurring)
(“[Eli Lilly] made clear that a finding of contributory infringement requires proof of either an intent to
induce illegal substitution or continued sales to particular customers whom the manufacturer knows or
should know are engaged in improper palming off.” (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)) (emphasis added)).
90
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
knowledge and imposing liability where “users” known to be attracted to Napster service were dubious,
as evidenced by company document mentioning the “need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and
IP addresses since they are exchanging pirated music”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
See, e.g., Inwood, 456 U.S. 844 (finding no liability, for continuing to supply generic pills that
looked like trademarked pills to pharmacists, even though some pharmacists used the pills to infringe;
because pharmacists were deemed to be trustworthy users who were not inclined to infringe, defendants
did not have sufficient reason to know that pharmacists would substitute generic pills for regular ones).
92
See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant
cannot avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and
maybe all) the users of his service are copyright infringers; “one who, knowing or strongly suspecting
that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact
knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal intent, because a
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of
mind”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93
See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that AOL had
reason to know that infringing copies of a work were stored on its servers, due to a phone call from an
AOL subscriber reporting the existence of unauthorized copies of works by various authors on a
particular USENET group, “alt.binaries.e-book”; the phone call labeling that USENET group as
dubious users “should have put AOL on notice of the infringing activity on the particular USENET
group at issue . . . .”).
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adequate notice of infringement: in determining whether distributor has a “reason
to know” that the use of a work was in fact infringing, courts have looked at
whether the flagged individual is considered dubious. 94
Finally, this factor poses a potential explanation for the heightened
requirement of “actual knowledge” in the online context, 95 as well as the stringent
DMCA notice requirements in the contributory copyright infringement context,
and similarly demanding common law notice requirements in the trademark
context. Because so many varying individuals use online services, it is usually less
feasible to label a service’s entire user-base “dubious,” 96 and hence to impute
intent in the online context, than to make the same determination regarding the
limited users of a physical service or product. 97 Furthermore, in the context of an
online service used by numerous individuals, the second policy goal of furthering
innovation and commerce is particularly strong, leaving courts reluctant to cut off
a service with even potential non-infringing uses. 98
b. Percentage of Use that Is Infringing
Even though some courts claim that the percentage of use that is infringing is
not to be considered in a court’s calculus as to whether to impose liability, so long
as the product or service is capable of non-infringing uses; 99 in actuality, the
percentage of uses that is infringing is an important factor in the outcome of a case.
When the overriding percentage of uses are infringing in a given case, this factor is

94
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374–75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (held that evidence posed an issue of fact as to whether service
provider had reason to know of infringing activity, in light of the fact that reported infringer was a nondubious, trustworthy former minister; “[in] the context of a dispute between a former minister and a
church he is criticizing, [online service provider] may be able to show that its lack of knowledge that
[online post] was infringing was reasonable”).
95
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
96
In many cases an online user-base constitutes a huge cross-section of the human population.
97
Compare Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264–65 (9th Cir. 1996) (where
court found knowledge, due to the fact that swap meet operator was aware of and disregarded dubious
music vendors’ blatant sales of counterfeit recordings on its premises, and as such, “actively str[o]ve[]
to provide the environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive”) with Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring that online service
provider have “actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system,” because
Google search engine is used and available to “all websites,” “automatically access[ing] thousands of
websites,” and this entire group of Google users could not be deemed “dubious”) (quoting Napster, 239
F.3d at 1022) .
98
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1170; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021; MetroGoldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931–34 (2005).
99
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (refusing to impute requisite level of knowledge to Napster
based on the fact a that large percentage of the use was infringing, because peer-to-peer file sharing
technology is capable of other non-infringing uses; finding that the “district court improperly confined
the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system’s capabilities . . . [and] placed undue weight on the
proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use”) (citiation
omitted) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442–43 (1984)
(rejecting argument that merely supplying the “‘means’ to accomplish an infringing activity” leads to
imposition of liability; framing the inquiry as whether the video tape recorder is “capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses”) (emphasis added)); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 264–67 (5th Cir. 1997) (single non-infringing use implicated Sony).
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predictive of a finding of liability. 100 Policy-wise, this factor comports with both
(1) the imputed intent doctrine (when the overriding percentage of uses of
service/product is dubious, the “natural and probable consequence[ ]” of
continuing to supply the service/product is infringement, and thus intent may be
imputed), 101 and (2) the policy goal of encouraging innovation when new products
and services are developed, and the desire to encourage vigorous commerce does
not extend to services or products that are being primarily used for illegal
conduct. 102 This factor features equally in cases analyzed under the inducement,
willful blindness, and knowledge doctrines.
c. Bad Faith/ Good Faith
The last factor, proof of overt bad faith on the part of the service provider, is
predictive of a finding of liability. 103 Overt bad faith exists when a service
provider, through acts or omissions, demonstrates disregard of the law and the
intent to be complicit with and further illegal conduct, such as by refusing to
cooperate with legal authorities 104 or flouting an existing infringement detection
system. 105 Overt bad faith may be visible from the outset of the provision of a
product or service (such as in an inducement context) 106 in addition to displaying
overt bad faith upon initial distribution of their products, or after infringement
100
See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, 1021 (stating that it was improper to confine use analysis
to current uses, ignoring the system’s capabilities, but finding liability where 87% of files available on
the Napster file sharing network were copyrighted).
101
“Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable
consequences of his conduct,” or consequences “certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act . .
. .” Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (“If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in
fact desired to produce the result.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. (1965)
(emphasis added))). The “natural consequences” of continuing to supply a product or service change
based on the percentage of uses that are infringing. C.f. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643,
649, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding “[w]hat is true is that when a supplier is offering a product or service
that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these
uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement”; explaining that listing examples of
potential noninfringing uses is not sufficient—”the [relevant] question is how probable [or frequent]
they are”).
102
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933, 941 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442) (“[Sony] struck a balance between
the interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial lawful
employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts
of others.”).
103
See e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
a swap meet “[could] not disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity,” when
swap meet holder reneged on its promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about
vendors) (citing Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
104
See, e.g., id. at 261 (finding liability where swap meet operator failed to provide Sheriff with
“identifying information from each vendor” after they had agreed to).
105
See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding liability where
AOL waited approximately half a year before registering the change of its contact e-mail address for
complaints about copyright infringement with the U.S. Copyright Office, and did not configure the old
e-mail address so that it would forward messages to the new address or return new messages to their
senders, so complaints sent during that time period went unheeded, without those complainants being
notified that their messages had not been delivered).
106
See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923–25 (displaying overt bad faith from the beginning of
distribution, by voicing illegal objectives).
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begins to occur (such as in a willful blindness or knowledge context). 107 Hence,
the tenor of a distributor’s response to the knowledge that his product is being used
for infringement becomes apparent from the totality of his behavior and approach
towards the law and legal authorities, and this factor is clearly relevant in a context
where courts are trying to determine level of intent.
6. Identifying the Three Factors in Seminal Cases
a. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
In Fonovisa, the court found a swap meet operator liable based on a general
“knowledge” theory (constructive versus actual knowledge was not specified). 108
In Fonovisa, the swap meet continued to provide facilities, after discovering that
its facilities were attractive to dubious users; namely, the operator knew that it was
creating swap meet facilities that were attracting shady, untrustworthy music
vendors seeking to sell counterfeit wares. 109 Furthermore, though an exact number
is not given, it appears that a massive percentage of the uses of the swap meet
facilities were infringing. 110 Finally, in Fonovisa there was overt bad faith on the
part of the swap meet operator from the time when pervasive infringement was
discovered pursuant to raids and its own investigation, including reneging on its
promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about vendors. 111 The
presence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of liability.
b. Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d
1143 (7th Cir. 1992)
In Hard Rock Café, the court held that the district court’s current findings did
not support the conclusion of contributory liability, but remanded for a
determination of whether evidence could support a finding of willful blindness
under the correct standard. 112 The court noted that relevant to whether the willful
blindness standard could be met was whether the swap meet operator perceived the
T-shirt vendors to be “dubious” or untrustworthy. 113 The fact that the infringing
107
See, e.g., Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1077 (flouting its existing notice system by failing to promptly
register a change in e-mail address and disregarding e-mails that were sent during the interim).
108
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264–65.
109
“There is also no dispute for purposes of this appeal that Cherry Auction and its operators were
aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit recordings in violation of Fonovisa’s
trademarks and copyrights. . . .” Id. at 261. “Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the
environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.” Id. at 264.
110
“Sheriff’s Department raided the Cherry Auction swap meet and seized more than 38,000
counterfeit recordings.” Id. at 264. “[I]t would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in
the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet.” Id. (emphasis
added).
111
“Sheriff sent a letter notifying Cherry Auction of the on-going sales of infringing materials, and
reminding Cherry Auction that they had agreed to provide the Sheriff with identifying information from
each vendor. In addition, in 1993, Fonovisa itself sent an investigator to the Cherry Auction site and
observed sales of counterfeit recordings.” Id. at 261 (emphasis added). “[A] swap meet cannot
disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity.” Id. at 265 (citing Hard Rock
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)).
112
Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149.
113
Id. at 1147, 1149.
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shirts had cut labels and were being sold for a cheap price (suspicious, dubious
behavior) was to be weighed against the fact that the T-shirts were made by
approved manufacturers and “[t]here does not seem to be any particular reason to
believe that inexpensive t-shirts with cut labels are obviously counterfeit”
(unsuspicious, non-dubious behavior) in determining whether or not the swap meet
manager suspected infringement and hence was willfully blind in failing to
investigate. 114 Thus one could conclude that T-shirt vendors one has not been
warned against trusting, 115 are less dubious and untrustworthy than music sellers
attracted to swap meets that have been extensively raided 116 or vendors of
counterfeit Louis Vuitton and Gucci. 117
Furthermore, the other factors in this case pointed towards a lack of liability:
the percentage of infringing uses of the swap meet grounds was relatively low, 118
and there was no appearance of overt bad faith on the part of the swap meet
operator after infringement was discovered. Unlike Fonovisa, in Hard Rock Café
infringement was not discovered before filing suit, 119 and the operator did not
renege on a promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about
vendors. Because the implicated key factors did not point clearly towards liability,
it is not surprising that the court held that the evidence presented a close question
of fact as to whether the swap meet operator was willfully blind to infringement. 120
c. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)
In Ellison, the court found an Internet service provider, America Online
(AOL), liable based on a “constructive knowledge” theory, even though Ellison
lacked actual knowledge. 121 In Ellison, AOL continued to provide services to a

114
Id. (“[Vendors] were selling t-shirts made by approved manufacturers . . . .” Despite the low
price and “low quality,” T-shirts were “made by approved manufacturers,” and Hard Rock gave no
warning about the sale of counterfeits prior to filing suit, and “made no effort to broadcast the
information that legitimate Hard Rock t-shirts could only be found in Hard Rock Cafes.”). The Hard
Rock Café court also noted the manager of the flea market saw the infringing shirts and:
[H]ad the opportunity to note that they had cut labels and were being sold cheap.
Further [the manager] testified that he did not ask vendors whether their goods
were counterfeit because they were sure to lie to him. One might infer from
these facts that [the manager] suspected that the shirts were counterfeits but
chose not to investigate. On the other hand . . . it is undisputed that Hard Rock
made no effort to broadcast the information that legitimate Hard Rock t-shirts
could only be found in Hard Rock Cafes. Moreover, there does not seem to be
any particular reason to believe that inexpensive t-shirts with cut labels are
obviously counterfeit, no matter what logo they bear.
Id. at 1149.
115
Id. at 1147 (“At no point before filing suit did Hard Rock warn [the defendant] . . . that the
shirts were counterfeits.”).
116
See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261, which the court labeled a clear case of liability.
117
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding genuine Vuitton and
Gucci bags are unlikely to display poor workmanship or purple vinyl linings).
118
Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1146 (“Before this case there [had] been [only] a few seizures of
counterfeit goods at Swap-O-Rama flea markets.”).
119
Id. at 1147 (“At no point before filing suit did Hard Rock warn [defendant] that the shirts were
counterfeits.”).
120
Id. at 1149.
121
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
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particular USENET group, after being put on notice that the particular group
“alt.binaries.e-books” was attractive to dubious users; namely, users who were
posting unauthorized copies of works by various authors. 122 Furthermore, the
evidence showed that the overriding percentage of uses of this particular USENET
group was infringing. 123 Finally, AOL demonstrated overt bad faith by changing
its contact e-mail address for receiving complaints and reports of copyright
infringement in an unreasonable manner that showed blatant disregard for reports
of illegal activity. 124 The presence of the three key factors is consistent with the
finding that AOL had “reason to know” that infringing copies of Ellison’s work
were stored on its USENET service, and hence was contributorily liable.
d. Religious Technology Center (RTC) v. Netcom On-line Communication
Services Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
In RTC, the court denied motions for a preliminary injunction 125 and
summary judgment, finding that the evidence posed an issue of fact as to whether
an online service operator had reason to know of infringing activity, in light of the
fact that the reported infringer was a non-dubious, trustworthy former minister
criticizing a church whose use was likely a fair one. 126 Percentage of infringing
uses was inapposite as a factor in RTC because there was only one potential
infringing use identified. Arguably, Netcom did demonstrate overt bad faith by
failing to even look at postings upon receiving notice of potential infringement, in
line with their investigative policies. 127 Thus, because the two implicated factors
cut in opposite directions regarding whether liability should be found, 128 it is not
surprising that the court held that the evidence presented a close question of fact as
to whether Netcom knew or should have known that the minister had infringed
plaintiff’s copyright. 129

122
Id. at 1077 (stating that a phone call from AOL subscriber to AOL, “should have put AOL on
notice of infringing activity on the particular USENET group at issue in this case, ‘alt.binaries.e-book.’
[The caller] contacted AOL to report the existence of unauthorized copies of works by various
authors.”).
123
Id. at 1075 (“The USENET news-group at issue in this case was used primarily to exchange
unauthorized digital copies of works by famous authors, including Ellison.”) (emphasis added).
124
Id. at 1077. AOL waited approximately six months before registering the change of its contact
e-mail address with the U.S. Copyright Office, and did not configure the old e-mail address so that it
would forward messages to the new address or return new messages to their senders, so complaints sent
during that time period went unheeded, without those complainants being notified that their messages
had not been delivered. Id. at 1077.
125
Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1383
(N.D. Cal. 1995). “[T]here is little evidence that Netcom . . . knew or should have known that Erlich
was engaged in copyright infringement of plaintiffs’ works and was not entitled to a fair use defense . . .
.” Id. at 1374.
126
Id. at 1374–75 (“Given the context of a dispute between a former minister and a church he is
criticizing, [online service provider] may be able to show that its lack of knowledge that [the online
post] was infringing was reasonable.”).
127
Id. at 1374–75 (“Netcom admits that it did not even look at the postings once given notice and
that had it looked at the copyright notice and statements regarding authorship, it would have triggered
an investigation into whether there was infringement.”).
128
A non-dubious user cuts in favor of finding no liability, and potential acts of overt bad faith cut
in favor of a finding of liability.
129
Id. at 1374.
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e. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982)
In Inwood, the court held that a drug manufacturer was not contributorily
liable for creating a generic pill similar in appearance to a trademarked drug, which
pharmacists subsequently mislabeled, because the trademark holder had not shown
that the manufacturer intentionally induced the pharmacists to mislabel generic
drugs or continued to supply the drug to pharmacists who the manufacturer knew
or should have known were mislabeling generic drugs. 130 Pharmacists are not
generally viewed as dubious or untrustworthy users who are seeking to infringe; in
fact the district court found that “to the extent mislabeling had occurred . . . it
resulted from pharmacists’ misunderstanding of the requirements of the New York
Drug Substitution Law, rather than from deliberate attempts” to infringe, 131 or
profit from substitution. 132 Furthermore, the district court found that incidents of
infringement were infrequent, and thus the percentage of infringing uses was
low. 133 Finally, the court found no overt evidence of bad faith, as the
manufacturer’s behavior reflected normal industry practice, 134 and use of the same
color for brand names and their generic equivalents had a functional purpose. 135
The absence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of no liability.
f. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (citations omitted), aff’d, Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999)
In Lockheed, the court found that an online service provider, NSI, was not
liable for accepting registrations of domain names similar to Lockheed’s trademark
and refusing to cancel them in response to Lockheed’s demands. 136 Though the
case was affirmed by the appellate court on other grounds, the district court held
that NSI lacked knowledge of infringement of Lockheed’s mark. 137 In Lockheed, a
massive number of varied users were registering domain names with NSI, and thus

130

Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982).
Id. at 853.
132
Id. at 856 n.16.
133
Id. at 852–53.
[The] trial court . . . considered evidence of actual instances of mislabeling by
pharmacists, since frequent improper substitutions of a generic drug for [a brand
name drug] could provide circumstantial evidence that the petitioners, merely by
making available imitative drugs in conjunction with comparative price
advertising, implicitly had suggested that pharmacists substitute improperly.
After reviewing the evidence of incidents of mislabeling, the district court
concluded that such incidents occurred too infrequently to justify the inference
that petitioners’ catalogs and use of imitative colors had ‘impliedly invited’
druggists to mislabel.
Id. at 852–53 (emphases added). “[O]nly a ‘few instances,’ rather than a substantial number, of
mislabelings occurred.” Id. at 857 n.17.
134
“The marketing methods used by Ives reflect normal industry practice.” Id. at 847.
135
Id. at 853, 857 n.20 (“[O]ffer[ing] a legitimate reason for producing an imitative product.”).
136
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
137
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(“[E]vidence does not show that NSI . . . knew or had reason to know that its services were being used
to infringe Lockheed’s service mark.”).
131
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the product was not specifically attractive to dubious users. 138 Because of the
large number of users, and the difficulty in determining when use of a trademark is
in fact infringing, 139 the percentage of infringing uses was not calculable. 140
Finally, NSI did not demonstrate overt bad faith or a disregard for the law, and in
fact implemented reasonable notice procedures with which Lockheed failed to
comply. 141 The absence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of no
liability.
g. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
In Napster, the court found a peer-to-peer software (P2P) provider, Napster,
liable based on actual and constructive knowledge. 142 Napster, from the outset,
took clear affirmative actions to attract dubious users to its product, such as
promoting the availability of infringing files, 143 and continued to provide its
unaltered services after discovering that its facilities were attractive to dubious
users who wanted to download illegal music. 144 Evidence indicated that an
overriding percentage of uses of Napster, eighty-seven percent, were infringing. 145
Finally, Napster demonstrated overt bad faith with Napster executives displaying
open disregard for the law by downloading copyrighted songs, 146 articulating the

138
“At the time of argument on this appeal, NSI was receiving approximately 130,000 registrations
per month, although evidence indicates that the number of monthly registrations has been increasing
steadily and is possibly much larger today.” Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 982.
139
Lockheed, 985 F. Supp at 951, 966 (noting “the inherent uncertainty in defining the scope of
intellectual property rights in a trademark,” and the subsequent “uncertainty inherent in any
determination that use of a domain name is infringing”).
140
Id. at 967 (The court found that “knowledge of infringement [could not] be imputed to NSI
because of the inherent uncertainty of trademark protection in domain names.”).
141
Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 982–83.
NSI [] maintain[s] a post-registration dispute-resolution procedure. Anyone who
feels that his or her rights are violated by the domain-name combination
maintained by a registrant can submit a certified copy of a trademark registration
to NSI. NSI then requires the registrant to obtain a declaratory judgment of the
right to maintain the domain-name combination. If the registrant fails to do so,
its registration is terminated. . . . Lockheed sent two letters, on May 7 and June
18, 1996 . . . NSI took no action on Lockheed’s requests, informing Lockheed by
letter that Lockheed had failed to comply with the terms of NSI’s dispute
resolution policy.
Id.
142
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
143
“Napster executives . . . have promoted the site with ‘screen shots listing infringing files.’” Id.
at 1020 n.5.
144
Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The software
systems in Napster and Grokster were engineered, disseminated, and promoted explicitly for the
purpose of facilitating piracy of copyrighted music and reducing legitimate sales of such music to that
extent. Most Napster and Grokster users understood this and primarily used those systems to purloin
copyrighted music.”); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013–14 (district court found that “evidence establishe[d]
that a majority of Napster users use the service to download and upload copyrighted music”).
145
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013 (“[T]he record supports the district court’s determination that ‘as
much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted and more than
seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs.’”).
146
“Napster executives . . . downloaded copyrighted songs from the system . . . .” Id. at 1020 n.5.
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need to remain ignorant of infringers’ identities, 147 and failing to fully remove
specifically identified infringing content. 148 The strong presence of the three key
factors is thus consistent with a finding of liability.
h. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005)
In Grokster, the Court found StreamCast and Grokster, two P2P providers,
liable based on an inducement theory. 149 StreamCast and Grokster took clear
affirmative actions at the outset of distribution to attract dubious users to their
product by gearing and promoting their product towards a known group of users
seeking to infringe—Napster users. 150 The Court noted explicit evidence
manifesting StreamCast and Grokster’s intent to attract and recruit dubious Napster
users as their “initial target market.” 151 Pursuant to StreamCast and Grokster’s
behavior, an overriding percentage of the uses of their products were infringing. 152
Though the Court concluded that no one could say how often the software was
used to obtain copies of unprotected material, “MGM’s evidence [that nearly 90%
of the files available for download on the system were copyrighted works] gives
reason to think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement,
and . . . the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.” 153
Finally, StreamCast and Grokster displayed overt bad faith from the time
when their products were first distributed by voicing illegal objectives, not merely

147
“[A] document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker mentioned ‘the need to remain
ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated music . . . .’” Id. at
1020 n.5.
148
The RIAA “informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, some of which are still
available.” Id. at 1020 n.5. “Although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering these
files, the songs are still available using the Napster service.” Id. at 1022 n.6.
149
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
150
Id. at 924. It was well-known that Napster users were “dubious” because Napster was then
under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement, and thus, it was clear that Napster users
were “of a mind to infringe.” Id. at 926, 937.
[I]nternal communication indicates [Grokster] aimed to have a larger number of
copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing networks.
The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just as it
would be with promotional materials developed showing copyrighted songs as
example of the kinds of files available. . . .
Id. at 925–26 (emphasis added).
151
Namely: (1) Streamcast and Grokster gave away programs compatible with Napster (and hence
desirable to Napster users), and then promoted their own interface to the individuals who showed
interested in the Napster-compatible programs, in an effort to “leverage Napster’s 50 million user base;”
(2) Internal company documents and e-mails verbalized the goal to attract large numbers of former
Napster users if Napster was shut down (by court order or otherwise), and to have a larger number of
copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file sharing networks; and (3) Messages to
advertisers and potential advertisers, broadcast banner advertisements to users of other Napstercompatible software, and promotional materials all espoused the view that Grokster and StreamCast
“planned to be the next Napster.” Id. at 924–25 (internal quotation marks omitted); Perfect 10, Inc., v.
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Further, the Grokster operators explicitly
targeted the then-current users of the Napster program by sending them ads for its OpenNap
Program.”).
152
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922–23
153
Id. In fact, the court stated that “[t]he argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is . . .
a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day.” Id. at 929.
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after massive infringement occurred. 154 In addition to displaying overt bad faith
upon initial distribution of their products, StreamCast and Grokster displayed
further overt bad faith after it became apparent that their products were primarily
being used by infringing users, such as rejecting another company’s offer to help
monitor infringement, blocking IP addresses of entities it believed were trying to
engage in such monitoring, and answering e-mails about using illegal content. 155
Thus, because Grokster was a case where all three key factors were unmistakably
present, it predictably resulted in a finding of liability.
i. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)
In Sony, the Court found that Sony, a home video recorder (HVR)
distributor, was not liable for contributory infringement based on a lack of imputed
intent or knowledge. 156 Though the Court made broad statements in dicta about
when intent may or may not be imputed, the holding in Sony is clearly in line with
other case law; all three key factors were lacking, pointing to a finding of no
liability. In Sony, the distributor took no affirmative actions to attract dubious
users to its product at the outset (such as advertising infringing uses), 157 and was
never presented with information that its product was specifically attracting
dubious purchasers seeking to use the HVRs to infringe. Furthermore, the
percentage of uses that were infringing was not overwhelming: “evidence showed
that the principle use of the VCR was . . . to be a fair, not an infringing use.” 158

154
The court explicitly noted that “[t]he record is replete with evidence that from the moment
Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective
that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage
infringement.” Id. at 923–24 (emphasis added). For example, “StreamCast [] planned to flaunt the
illegal uses of its software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of the
company averred that ‘[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued. It’s the best way to get
into the new[s].’” Id. at 925.
155
First, upon learning that the “substantive volume [of users’ demand was] a function of free
access to copyrighted work,” the companies attempted to translate that demand into advertising dollars.
Id. at 926. Second, there was “no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted
material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files” even after
receiving notice and acquiring knowledge of such infringement. Id. at 923 (“[I]t is uncontested that
[defendants] are aware that users employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files, even if
the decentralized [] networks fail to reveal which files are being copied and when.”). And after
receiving notices, Grokster sent warning e-mails, but never blocked anyone from continuing to use its
software to share copyrighted files, “rejected another company’s offer of help to monitor infringement,
[and] blocked IP addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its
networks.” Id. at 926–27. Also “neither company attempted to develop filtering tools.” Id. at 939.
And lastly, the companies responded with guidance to e-mails from users who had questions about
using illegal content. Id. at 923 (“[M]oreover, the companies have learned about their users’
infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each company with questions about
playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom the companies have responded with
guidance.”).
156
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
157
“Although Sony’s advertisements urged consumers to buy the VCR to ‘record favorite shows’
or ‘build a library’ of recorded programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing.” Grokster,
545 U.S. at 931 (discussing Sony, 464 U.S. 417).
158
Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643,
651 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 421) (“Court [] thought it important to say the Betamax
was used ‘principally’ for time shifting.”). The Court remarked that in Sony, “the plaintiffs owned only
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Finally, the distributor in Sony did not display overt bad faith or disregard of the
law. Thus, lacking these three factors, no actual or imputed intent could be
proven, 159 and the Court found that Sony was not contributorily liable.
j. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
In In re Aimster, the court found Aimster, a P2P software provider, liable
based on a willful blindness theory. 160 Aimster and Madster took clear affirmative
actions from the outset of distribution to attract dubious users to their product,
gearing their one income-generating product towards users seeking infringing
content. 161 Furthermore, according to the evidence, uses of Aimster were almost
entirely infringing or entirely infringing. 162 Finally, Aimster demonstrated overt
bad faith and disregard for the law by creating an encryption function in order to
evade liability under case law 163 and using infringing files in a tutorial on how to
use Aimster software. 164 Thus, because In re Aimster was a case where all three
key factors were unmistakably present, it predictably resulted in a finding of
liability.
B. The Continuation of Common Law Principles in the DMCA
This article argues that despite the DMCA’s statutory origins, the DMCA is
actually consistent with the three-factor paradigm of contributory infringement
from the common law. “Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to comply with
international copyright treaties and to update domestic copyright law for the online
world.” 165 Specifically, Congress enacted Title II of the DMCA, the Online

a small percentage of the total amount of copyrighted television programming and it was unclear how
many of the other owners objected to home taping.” Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 443).
159
“On th[e] facts [of Sony, there was] no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote
infringing uses.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439).
160
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643.
161
Club Aimster, the means by which Aimster is financed, enables paying members to download
with a single click the music most often shared by Aimster users, which is copyrighted. Id. at 651–52
(“Club Aimster lists only the 40 songs that are currently the most popular among its members;
invariably these are under copyright.”). It could also be argued that Aimster and Madster promoted
their product towards a known group of users seeking to infringe—Napster users, with the names,
Aimster and Madster made to sound like a spin off on “Napster.” Id. at 645.
162
Id. at 649, 653 (holding Aimster liable for “fail[ing] to produce any evidence that its service has
ever been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the frequency of such uses”).
“[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has non-infringing as well as infringing uses,
some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory
infringement.” Id. at 649.
163
Id. at 650 (holding that defendant could not use encryption software “to prevent himself from
learning what surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service–maybe all the
users of his service–are copyright infringers”). “Aimster failed to . . . present evidence that the
provision of an encryption capability effective against the service provider itself added important value
to the service or saved significant cost. Aimster blinded itself in the hope that by doing so it might
come within the rule of the Sony decision.” Id. at 653.
164
Id. at 651 (“In explaining how to use the Aimster software, the tutorial gives as its only
examples of file sharing the sharing of [notice given] copyrighted music . . . . The tutorial is [an]
invitation to infringement.”).
165
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105–304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02[A] (2003); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW OF
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Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), to facilitate
cooperation among internet service providers and copyright owners “to detect and
deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked
environment.” 166 Through this statute, Congress attempted “to provide ‘greater
certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements
that [might] occur in the course of their activities.’” 167
The DMCA did not rewrite or attempt to clarify copyright law for the online
world. 168 Rather, Congress opted to leave current law and instead create a series
of safe harbors, to limit service provider’s liability for claims of copyright
infringement when a “provider is found to be liable under existing principles of
law.” 169 Thus, a claim against a service provider for contributory copyright
infringement is evaluated just as it would be in the non-online context; only after it
is determined whether common law liability exists, does the court make an
evaluation as to whether a DMCA safe harbor applies, absolving liability. 170
1. Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)
“To be eligible for any of the four safe harbor limitations of liability, a
service provider must meet the conditions for eligibility set forth in OCILLA.” 171
Namely, the safe harbors only apply to a service provider who meets certain
threshold requirements, including that the service provider:
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of
the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures. 172

Courts have interpreted DMCA § 512(i)(A) to contain a three prong requirement: a
service provider must “(1) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of
service access for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2)
implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the
policy.” 173 A service provider “implements” a policy if it (a) has a working
notification system, (b) has a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant
notifications, and (c) does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting

INTERNET DISPUTES § 6.02 (2002)).
166
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2003) and quoting S. REP. NO. 104–190, at 20 (1998); H.R.
REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1077.
169
Id. at 1076–77 (quoting S. REP. NO 105–109, at 19) (citing 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(a)–(d) (West
2003)).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1080 (citation omitted).
172
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i) (West 2003).
173
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1080 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i) (West 2003)).
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information needed to issue such notifications. 174 Implementation is “reasonable”
if, under “appropriate circumstances,” the service provider terminates users who
repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright. 175
2. Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
Section 512(c) of the DMCA “limits the liability of qualifying service
providers for claims of direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement for storage
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider.” 176 Under § 512(c)(1), a service
provider qualifies for safe harbor if it meets the requirements of § 512(i) and:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or
disable access to, the material;
(B) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 177

Under the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “red flag” doctrine, “a service provider may
lose immunity if it fails to take action with regard to infringing material when it is
‘aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.’
Notice that fails to substantially comply with § 512(c)(3), however, cannot be
deemed to impart such awareness.” 178
3. Identifying the Three Factors in the DMCA
According to the legislative history of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 requisites
that must be met in order for a service provider to be afforded a safe harbor are
separate and independent from the contributory infringement requirements, and
shift the burden to the copyright owner. 179 However, in reality, the same three key
factors (attraction of dubious users, percentage of infringing uses, and bad faith)

174

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at

1080).
175
Id. at 1109–10 (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (W.D.
Wa. 2004)).
176
Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (West 2003).
178
CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114 (quoting § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)) (citing §§ 512(c)(3)(B)(i) & (ii)) (holding
that names of websites containing words such as “illegal” or “stolen” or fact that website was used for
“password-hacking” were insufficient to constitute red-flags of infringement).
179
See id. at 1113 (“The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”).
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that arise in the context of common law contributory liability are implicated in the
determination of eligibility for a safe harbor.
A § 512(i) repeat infringer policy that is reasonably implemented facilitates
the identification and termination of acknowledged infringers. An online service
with a functioning and enforced repeat infringer policy is unlikely to attract
“dubious users” seeking a forum conducive to infringement. It is similarly
unlikely that an online service provider with such a policy will find itself
overwhelmingly used for infringing purposes. Furthermore, the continuous effort
required to maintain and reasonably implement a viable repeat infringer policy
demonstrates regard for the law, and a lack of bad faith. 180 Conversely, a failure to
maintain and reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy, demonstrating bad
faith and disregard for the law, causes the online service provider to lose the
protection of the DMCA safe harbors. 181
Section 512(c) is similarly consistent with the body of common law and
principles behind it. Section 512(c) provides that if a service provider lacks
statutorily compliant notice, and has no other means of actual knowledge or “red
flags” (constructive knowledge) of infringement, and meets all other DMCA
requirements, then he is protected by the DMCA safe harbors. The actual and
constructive knowledge portions of § 512(c) mirror the actual and constructive
knowledge requirements in common law. As for the requirement of statutorily
compliant notice, and disqualification of notices that are not statutorily compliant
for the purposes of imparting knowledge, 182 under common law, courts have
refused to hold distributors liable if the distributor put into place a reporting policy
and notice was not compliant with that policy. 183 Similarly, the § 512(c)(iii)
provision provides a safe harbor to online service providers who act expeditiously
180
See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1110 (finding that CCBill reasonably implemented a repeat infringer
policy when it made a good faith effort to record; record did not reflect a failure “to record webmasters
associated with allegedly infringing websites,” where the e-mail address and/or name of most
webmasters were routinely recorded in a log and chart).
181
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding Aimster liable for
attempting to evade the law under Sony, finding that Aimster did not reasonably implement its stated
repeat infringer policy because the encryption on Aimster rendered it impossible to ascertain which
users were transferring which files; “far from doing anything to discourage repeat infringers of the
plaintiff’s copyrights, Aimster invited them to do so, showed them how they could do so with ease
using its system, and by teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted
materials disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement”).
182
See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114.
183
See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982–83 (9th Cir.
1999) (refusing to hold NSI liable for contributory infringement despite letters from Lockheed claiming
that two registrations were infringing its trademark, because NSI maintained a reasonable dispute
resolution procedure with which Lockheed failed to comply).
NSI [] maintain[s] a post-registration dispute-resolution procedure. Anyone who
feels that his or her rights are violated by the domain-name combination
maintained by a registrant can submit a certified copy of a trademark registration
to NSI. NSI then requires the registrant to obtain a declaratory judgment of the
right to maintain the domain-name combination. If the registrant fails to do so,
its registration is terminated. . . . Lockheed sent two letters, on May 7 and June
18, 1996 . . . NSI took no action on Lockheed’s requests, informing Lockheed by
letter that Lockheed had failed to comply with the terms of NSI’s dispute
resolution policy.
Id.
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to remove or disable access to infringing material upon obtaining knowledge or
awareness of it, comports with the “bad faith” inquiry performed by courts under
the common copyright law and parallel trademark law; 184 when a distributor
demonstrates willingness to cooperate with the law, courts have consistently been
reluctant to impose liability. 185
Thus, although the DMCA is legislative in origin, it implicates the same
factors and policies underlying the common law. If a distributor gears his product
towards dubious users, the overriding percentage of uses of his service are
infringing, and he displays a bad faith attitude towards compliance of the law.
Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the distributor will be sheltered by the
DMCA safe harbors from liability.
4. The Policy Goals Behind Limiting Constructive Knowledge Upheld
Through the DMCA
In their dicta limiting the constructive knowledge doctrine, courts aimed to
protect “defendant[s] [who] merely sell[] a commercial product suitable for some
lawful use,” but subsequently the product is overwhelmingly used by infringers. 186
Courts have been reluctant to impose liability on such a defendant because such
infringing uses were not his initial intent, and courts did not want to discourage
prospective innovators from offering new products and services, chilling
commercial growth. 187 The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions protect such
defendants who, upon becoming aware of infringing uses, implement a reasonable
policy to terminate repeat infringers. 188 Thus, per the DMCA, even if intent is
imputed from knowledge that a service is being overwhelmingly used for
infringing uses, the defendant is only liable if he continues to provide services and
takes no steps to prevent infringement using his service or product.

184
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that eBay was not
liable for contributory infringement because “to the extent the [notices] that Tiffany submitted gave
eBay reason to know that particular listings were for counterfeit goods, eBay did not continue to carry
those listings once it learned that they were specious . . . eBay’s practice was promptly to remove the
challenged listing from its website . . . .”).
185
But see Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 1022 n.6
(2005) (holding Napster liable for not removing identified infringing content in a timely manner;
“although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering these files, the songs are still available
using the Napster service”).
186
Id. at 936.
187
Viacom, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[W]ithout
clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the
expansion of the speed and capacity of the internet.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ellison v.
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“Congress enacted title II of the DMCA ‘to provide
greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur
in the course of their activities.’”).
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IV. A LOOK AT TWO RECENT 2010 CASES IN LIGHT OF THE THREE FACTORS
A. A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)
In Tiffany v. eBay, the court found that eBay was not contributorily liable for
infringement of Tiffany products being sold on its website. 189 This “no liability”
ruling is consistent with the previous body of case law when assessed in light of
the three previously identified factors. First, eBay attracts a massive number of
varied sellers, and thus, the eBay service is not specifically attractive to dubious
users. 190 Furthermore, within the subgroup of “Tiffany sellers,” it is difficult to
distinguish between trustworthy users selling second-hand Tiffany goods from
dubious users selling counterfeit Tiffany’s goods. 191 Secondly, even within the
subgroup of “Tiffany sellers,” the district court found that the percentage of uses
that were infringing, though significant, were not overriding. 192 Finally, eBay did
not display overt bad faith or disregard of the law. To the contrary, the district
court found that eBay acted in “good faith,” established and implemented
reasonable rules and procedures against infringers, and spent a significant amount
of money, resources, and time screening for infringers generally—and Tiffany
infringers specifically. 193 Thus, because Tiffany was a case where all three key
factors were conspicuously absent, it predictably resulted in a finding of “no
liability.”

189

Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93.
Id. at 97 (“eBay has been enormously successful. More than six million new listings are posted
on its site daily. At any given time it contains some 100 million listings.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
191
See id. at 97–98 (“[Tiffany] does not—nor can it, for that matter—control the legitimate
secondary market in authentic Tiffany silver jewelry. Even had [eBay] been able to inspect the goods,
moreover, in many instances it likely would not have had the expertise to determine whether they were
counterfeit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
Though evidence based on surveys performed by Tiffany found 73.1% of the purported Tiffany
goods purchased in 2004 and 75.5% of the goods purchased in 2005 were counterfeit, the district court
discounted this evidence because the surveys were “methodologically flawed and [hence] of
questionable value,” and “provided limited evidence as to the total percentage of counterfeit goods
available on eBay at any time.” Id. (citations omitted). Instead, the court found that although “a
significant portion of the Tiffany sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website . . . was counterfeit,”
and that “eBay knew that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website might be counterfeit . . .
however, [] a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are [also] sold on eBay.” Id. at 98.
193
“eBay spends as much as $20 million each year on tools to promote trust and safety on its
website,” and implemented a “fraud engine” computer program principally dedicated to finding “illegal
listings,” with “Tiffany-specific filters,” and a notice and takedown system, removing reported listing
within twenty-four hours of receiving a notice form. Id. at 98–99. “eBay never refused to remove a
reported Tiffany listing, acted in good faith in responding to Tiffany’s notices, and always provided
Tiffany with the seller’s contact information.” Id. at 99. eBay implemented “special warning messages
when a seller attempted to list a Tiffany item,” cancelled particular suspicious transactions, employed a
“three strikes rule” for suspending vendors, and delayed the ability of buyers to view listings of certain
brand names, including Tiffany’s, to give rights holders, such as Tiffany, more time to review those
listings. Id. at 99–100.
190
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B. A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Viacom
International Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
In Viacom v. YouTube, the court found that YouTube was not contributorily
liable for the infringement of Viacom’s works reproduced on its website. This “no
liability” ruling is consistent with the previous body of case law, when assessed in
light of the three previously identified factors. First, unlike the P2P cases,
YouTube attracts a massive number of varied uploading users, and thus, the
YouTube service is not specifically attractive to dubious users. 194 Secondly, the
district court found that the percentage of uses that were infringing could not even
be established. 195 Finally, YouTube did not display overt bad faith or disregard of
the law; to the contrary, YouTube has a designated agent who swiftly removes
infringing content in response to DMCA notices. 196 Thus, despite dicta stating
that the application of Grokster “to the particular subset of service providers
protected by the DMCA is strained,” a consistent thread runs between the results of
the common law copyright cases and the DMCA cases. Because YouTube was a
case where all three key factors were conspicuously absent, it predictably resulted
in a finding of “no liability.”
V. CONCLUSION
Analyzing the often contradictory dicta in contributory trademark and
copyright cases, especially as applied in the online context, it is easy to conclude
that this is an area of law where standards are constantly shifting. However, a
closer look reveals consistent results both within the bodies of contributory
copyright infringement cases and contributory trademark infringement cases,
respectively, as well as underlying commonalities between the two doctrines. The
same three factors consistently predict liability under both doctrines, carrying
through in the DMCA context as well.

194
Despite Viacom’s contentions that YouTube “welcomed [the posting of] copyright—infringing
material . . . on their website” because “[s]uch material was attractive to users, whose increased usage
enhanced defendant’s income from advertising,” it is not clear that the site specifically attracts dubious
users or that the majority of uses of the site are infringing. Viacom, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp.
2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “Presently, over 24 hours of new video-viewing time is uploaded to the
YouTube website every minute.” Id.
195
“[T]he infringing works in suit may be only a small fraction of millions of works posted by
others on the service’s platform.” Id. at 524.
196
Compare, id. at 519 (“[YouTube] designated an agent, and when they received specific notice
that a particular item infringed a copyright, they swiftly removed it. It is uncontroverted that all clips in
suit are off the YouTube website . . . .”) with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020
n.5, 1022 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the RIAA “informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files,
some of which are still available . . . . Although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering
these files, the songs are still available using the Napster service”).

